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Citizenship and Inclusion: Rethinking the Analytical Category of Noncitizenship
Abstract
The paper problematises the category of noncitizenship. It traces its trajectory in 
accounts of inclusive citizenship and argues that it is difficult to theorise it as a 
distinct theoretical category outside of citizenship. To support this argument, the 
paper distinguishes between a pluralist, political, and democratic variant of accounts 
of inclusive citizenship; and it shows how they all end up reducing noncitizenship to a 
journey to citizenship. To overcome this limit, the paper develops the idea of 
subversive politicisation and suggests that injustices and inequalities can be 
challenged without falling back on the vocabulary of citizenship. 
Keywords: politicisation; exclusion; democracy; inclusive citizenship; political 
membership
Introduction
2In the ‘Decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man’, a short chapter 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt famously (and ambiguously) 
defined citizenship as the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1968, 296). Writing in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust and in the wake of the emergence of statelessness as a 
mass phenomenon, it was clear to Arendt that ‘the loss of citizenship deprived people 
not only of protection, but also of all clearly established, officially recognised 
identity’ (1968, 287). Does Arendt’s emphasis on the primacy of citizenship still 
resonate today? The answer one gives to this question bears strongly on discussions of 
noncitizenship. Seeking to contribute to such discussions, this special issue on 
Theorising Noncitizenship exploits the ambivalence of the prefix non and enquires 
into the primacy of citizenship.  In so doing, it carves out a space for noncitizenship 
as a distinct analytical category and invites contributors to reflect on its nature.  The 
paper responds to this invitation. It problematises the distinctiveness of noncitizenship 
as an analytical category and explores its relationship with citizenship. 
For the purposes of this paper, noncitizenship is taken to denote the condition of being 
where access to basic political rights is precarious and insecure. Noncitizenship is not 
the same as bare humanity, by which I mean a state of existence stripped of all rights 
and dependent on international human rights law (see Agamben, 1998). Although the 
conditions of existence that define the life of the noncitizen can be likened to 
conditions of bare humanity; the way I use the concept here steers away from such 
comparisons. This is because the underlying objective of the paper is to draw out and 
explore the political dimension of noncitizenship – the extent to which noncitizenship, 
as an umbrella term, successfully captures and challenges the exclusions, inequalities, 
injustices and naturalisations that accompany citizenship politics. Does noncitizenship 
transgress the relationship with citizenship, in line with the intentions of the special 
issue, or does it end up reproducing the relationship with citizenship that it seeks to 
overcome? 
To addressing this question, the paper traces the trajectory of the concept of 
noncitizenship in accounts of inclusive citizenship and shows its floating nature. In 
particular, the paper distinguishes between a pluralist, political and democratic variant 
of accounts of inclusive citizenship; and highlights the shifts and turnings in the 
meaning of noncitizenship within such accounts. The paper argues that although all 
3variants seek to interrogate and blur the binary citizen/noncitizen, they end up 
reinstating it. On the assumption that citizenship is the most valuable practice, the 
benchmark for evaluating – acknowledging and noticing –the demands raised by a 
variety of groups; the three variants cancel out noncitizenship as an analytical 
category. Noncitizenship becomes reduced to a journey to citizenship and, as such, it 
looses meaning and force. What are the implications of this loss? Although the paper 
suggests that it is possible to challenge exclusions, inequalities and injustices without 
references to noncitizenship, it does not altogether dismiss noncitizenship as a 
concept. Instead, the paper develops a comparison with the concept of politicisation 
and suggests that the first step to consolidating the analytical force of noncitizenship 
lies in the attenuation of the relationship with citizenship. 
This argument develops in two sections. The first section starts with the examination 
of the concept of noncitizenship within accounts of inclusive citizenship, giving an 
idea of their limitations. The second section explores these limitations further through 
the comparison with the concept of politicisation. 
Citizenship, Inclusion and Noncitizenship.
The category of noncitizenship confronts the theorist with a challenge. While it is 
apparent who the noncitizen is – anyone who does not have access to the formal rights 
of citizenship; the prefix non, that simultaneously affirms and negates citizenship, 
bears the marks of a challenge. How do we determine the usage of the term? That is, 
how do we interpret and theorise it, as an affirmation or as a negation of citizenship, 
or both? Seeking to offer an answer to these questions, the section explores the 
category of noncitizenship through the lens of accounts of inclusive citizenship. By 
accounts of inclusive citizenship, I mean the growing body of work that highlights 
and challenges the exclusions that accompany citizenship politics, with the aim of 
extending – redescribing and opening up – the practices that are considered to be 
citizenic (Kabeer, 2005; Marin, 2010; Soysal, 1994; Andersen and Siim, 2004; 
Gaventa and Tandon, 2010; Lister, 2007). While accounts of inclusive citizenship 
come in many forms, in this section I distinguish and focus on the three variants that I 
term pluralist, political, and democratic. The terms ‘pluralist’ and ‘democratic’ issue 
from a retrospective reading of work on citizenship. They selectively capture the 
4common threads running through this body of work and bring attention to the shifts 
and turnings in the meaning of noncitizenship. By contrast, the term ‘political’ stems 
from the intention to politicise the experience of noncitizenship - that is characteristic 
of the type of work that the section focuses on. 
There are three reasons why the frame of inclusive citizenship offers a fertile ground 
for theorising noncitizenship. First, accounts of inclusive citizenship problematise the 
relation between citizen and noncitizen, and in so doing, accentuate the ambivalence 
at the heart of the category of noncitizenship. Second, they expose the difficulty 
facing theorisations of noncitizenship as a distinct analytical category, namely, the 
reproduction of the relationship with citizenship. Third, they foreground inclusion as 
an inescapable dimension of theories of noncitizenship. Seeking to isolate this 
dimension and, thus, show the conceptual overlap between theories of noncitizenship 
and accounts of inclusive citizenship, the section subsumes the former under the 
latter; and it discusses work on noncitizenship as the political variant of accounts of 
inclusive citizenship. Before this, however, the section explores the pluralist variant.     
The pluralist variant develops on the terrain of identity politics, particularly in work 
that seeks to address the challenges currently confronting multicultural and 
multinational democracies – such as ensuring democratic equality while respecting 
difference  (see Kymlicka 1996, 2001; Lister, 2007). It takes issue with the formalistic 
and universal dimensions of citizenship and highlights issues of entry, recognition, 
and rights (Kymlicka, 1996, 2001; Isin and Wood, 1999; Pakulski, 1997; Parekh, 
2000; Philips, 2003; Stevenson, 2003; Young, 1995, 2000). Concerned with the ways 
in which liberal democracies exclude, assimilate and discriminate against difference, 
theorists in the pluralist canon seek to renegotiate the terms and modes of 
membership. The term ‘pluralist’ derives from this renegotiation, for the primary aim 
here is to challenge the uniformity of citizenship by opening up and accentuating 
modes of membership that differ from and often challenge its dominant mould. 
Indeed, citizenship denotes membership on this account. It is associated with the 
typical Marshallian rights – civil, political, social – and it has liberal and legalistic 
overtones that carry over to the requisites for inclusive citizenship (see Marshall, 
1950). These consist of less stringent criteria for entry into citizenship – ranging from 
residence to universal personhood (Soysal, 1994); formal recognition of particularity, 
5the different ways one is and acts as a citizen (Young, 1995); and the expansion of 
formal legal rights to include (often by differentiating) excluded groups (Kymlicka, 
1996, 2001; Parekh, 2000). Formal rights and rules ease the passage to citizenship. 
More importantly, they initiate a shift in the very norms and practices of citizenship. 
To see this shift more clearly – that the second and third variants of inclusive 
citizenship rely on – it is important to notice the three key contributions of the 
pluralist account to narratives of inclusive citizenship. The first consists in its 
sophisticated account of exclusion. By distinguishing between outer and ‘inner 
exclusion’i (Taylor 1999, 276) work on identity politics brings attention to the 
continuous interplay between citizen and noncitizen, to the back and forth movement 
between experiencing political life as a citizen and as a noncitizen. If the rights-holder 
experiences exclusion (because of her identity, lifestyle, culture or religion), then the 
analytical category of noncitizenship does not just emerge when there is limited (or 
no) access to rights, but also when there is access to citizenship. Second and closely 
related, the pluralist variant notably expands the realm of noncitizenship. The 
noncitizen is the outsider, the different, the denizen, the third-country national, the 
illegal immigrant, the refugee, the woman – that is, anyone mistrusted, marginalised 
or stigmatised by dominant norms. While this expansion subverts the divide between 
inside/outside which citizenship perpetuates, it does not do away with the divide 
itself. Citizenship remains the most important form of membership and the noncitizen, 
as I will explain later in the section, is only seen to strive for inclusion (even when 
this is conceived in differential terms). 
Third, the attention to law, that is, to the range of measures necessary to alleviate 
exclusionary politics – ranging from multicultural policies to positive discrimination 
and human rights law – fosters democratic practice. This means that inclusive 
citizenship is not simply seen as a moral good that liberal societies aspire to, but as a 
distinctly democratic good that can in fact be put into practice. Therefore, the focus 
on the legal and liberal dimensions of political membership, pressed by the pluralist 
variant, opens the way for attending to practice; and, in so doing, it casts light on the 
everyday, political and democratic parameters of this practice. Of course, it might be 
more accurate to use the past tense here and take the pluralist variant as the 
predecessor to what I here designate as the democratic and political variants – 
6especially if we consider that work on identity politics was at its height in the eighties 
and nineties. However, I think it is more useful to avoid a linear narrative and 
emphasise their interlacing. This interlacing becomes more evident when we direct 
attention to the work of specific theorists. Seyla Benhabib’s work serves as a good 
example here (Benhabib, 2005, 2007, 2009). 
Benhabib is deeply dissatisfied with liberal accounts of citizenship as a status. 
However, she neither rejects rights-based approaches to citizenship nor does she 
reconceptualise citizenship with the aim of making it more inclusive – at least not 
explicitly. Instead, she strongly defends the idea of ‘citizenship of place’, citing the 
disaggregation of citizenship rights in international legislation (Benhabib, 2005, 2007; 
see also Gordon-Zolov, 2010, 275); and she argues that the jurisgenerative capacity of 
international human rights law has the potential to ‘develop new vocabularies for 
public claim making, by encouraging new forms of subjectivity to engage with the 
public sphere, and by interjecting existing relations of power with anticipations of 
justice to come’ (Benhabib, 2009, 696). Therefore, the point here is that Benhabib 
turns to (international) law to ascertain the rights and, crucially, subjectivities of 
noncitizens. She distinguishes between rights, subjectivity and membership to the 
nation state and, in so doing, she prefigures the distinction that the political variant 
draws between citizenship as membership status and noncitizenship as emergent 
condition. At the same time, Benhabib’s focus on democratic iterations (2009), that is, 
on deliberative exchanges that contest, expand, and transform existing practices of 
citizenship, interlaces with the emphasis that the democratic variant places on 
practice. Indeed, it can be argued that the reason that Benhabib’s work perfectly 
illustrates the interlacing between the three variants of inclusive citizenship is because 
it combines the focus on the practice of noncitizenship (that perforates the political 
and democratic variants) with an account of noncitizenship as an often permanent, 
outside yet inside, legal and political status (pluralist and political variants). This 
account of noncitizenship lies at the centre of  the political variant of inclusive 
citizenship that I now move on to examine.  
In particular, the political variant encompasses ethnographic and sociological work on 
noncitizenship. In contrast with the other two variants that expand on the realm of 
noncitizenship, the political variant narrows it down to the field of migration. This 
7means that the noncitizen denotes a particular form of exclusion that challenges the 
inside/outside boundaries of the political community. She is, for example, the long 
term migrant who has temporary and often precarious access to citizenship rights, or 
little to no access to such rights by virtue of her irregularity (De Genova and Peutz, 
2010; Squire, 2010; Hepworth 2014a, 2014b). The noncitizen, so articulated, 
foregrounds a more nuanced relationship with citizenship than the one that we notice 
in the pluralist variant. For example, on some accounts, the noncitizen is expelled 
from the order of citizenship (see Hepworth’s account of abject citizenship, 2014b); 
on other accounts, she oscillates between security and insecurity (see the account of 
precariousness developed by Goldring et al, 2009); and yet on other accounts, the 
noncitizen challenges the juridical world of citizenship (Nyers, 2003). Despite such 
understandable variations, however, this critical literature on noncitizenship agrees 
that far from being the mere victim of state-policies, the noncitizen exposes, disrupts, 
and exceeds such policies. The type of negotiations that noncitizen actions elicit, such 
as unauthorised cross-border mobility, question the meaning of legal citizenship and 
also, crucially, enact citizenship (Hepworth, 2014a). That is, they express a form of 
embodied and emergent citizenship that directly undermines the legal status of 
(non)citizenship (Hepworth, 2014a, 2014b; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2012). 
This emphasis on citizenship enactment constitutes the most important contribution of 
this variant to accounts of inclusive citizenship. First, it shows that political agency, 
far from being confined to citizens, attaches also to noncitizens. Noncitizens contest 
and challenge the inside-outside distinction that the state system perpetuates and, by 
so doing, they politicise, claim and embody,  a type of citizenship that exists 
alongside standard accounts. Second, the emphasis is placed upon political agency, 
showing that far from seeking to open up or modify the legal order of citizenship, 
theorists of noncitizenship interrogate and, notably, defy the distinction  between 
legality and illegality pressed by vocabularies of citizenship. Understood as a 
permanent condition, noncitizenship exceeds and subverts the limits set on 
politicisation by legal rules. This primacy given to politics over law has a noteworthy 
implication for accounts of inclusive citizenship. Although inclusion into citizenship 
looses the legal overtones that it carries in the pluralist variant, it finesses a socio-
political process that at once augments and reinstates the citizenic logic of politics.  
While noncitizens politicise against the legal rules of citizenship, their politicisations, 
8anchored as they are in the language of citizenship, precipitate nothing less but the 
expansion of its politics – or, at least, the expansion of what is considered as citizen 
politics. Therefore, the third, related, contribution to accounts of inclusive citizenship 
is the move away from the pluralist variant’s focus on membership to highlight the 
limits of (non)citizenship as a legal status. By identifying ways of being a citizen 
outside of and beyond the legal parameters of citizenship, it paves the way for the 
democratic variant that probes deeper into the conditions of this emergent, disruptive 
and political noncitizenship. 
In particular, the first thing to notice about the democratic variant is that it breaks 
further away from accounts of citizenship as legal status (political variant) and 
membership (pluralist variant). Instead, it focuses on the participatory dimension of 
citizenship and draws attention to political practices that challenge and transgress 
conventional ways of contributing to citizen politics – such as, for example, voting 
(Mohanty and Tandon, 2006; Pateman, 2012; Cornwall and Coelho, 2006; Desforges, 
Jones and Woods, 2005; Kopf, 2010). In line, therefore, with the political variant, the 
democratic one accentuates the focus on political practice – on the many sites and 
scenes of citizenship (Isin, 2008). However, in contrast with the political variant, it 
does neither limit this practice to migrants nor to politicisation. Instead, the 
democratic variant opens up noncitizen practice to other actors (such as the poor as 
we will shortly see); and it ties politicisation with democratisation – that is, with other 
ways of experiencing and practicing democracy. Thus the first distinctive contribution 
of this variant to narratives of inclusive citizenship issues from its expanded account 
of practice.
Two theoretical ideas underpin this account: citizenship practice as an everyday, 
lived, experience and citizenship practice as participation/deliberation in dynamics of 
governing. Ruth Lister explains that lived experiences of citizenship consist of 
renegotiations of rights and responsibilities in the everyday and not just in moments 
conventionally considered to be democratic – such as protests or elections (Lister, 
2007). Lived citizenship, as renegotiation, emerges in the workplace, the private 
realm and/or the domain of the intimate (see Cohen, 2009). Of course, the citizen 
qualities of such everyday renegotiations of rights, duties and obligations might be 
critically questioned. However, to confine thinking to such criticisms would be to 
9miss the emphasis on the lived and experienced. This emphasis, as Lister highlights, 
draws attention to the system, to those enabling/disabling conditions (material and 
cultural) that carry implications for the everyday life of (non)citizens (Lister, 2007). 
The participatory form that citizenship action takes in the democratic variant further 
accentuates this focus on the systemic conditions that often hinder citizen 
involvement and input to ways of governing. By drawing attention to persistent 
inequalities of wealth, position, societal status, skills and abilities, and the way these 
undermine democratic life, the deliberative perspectiveii has developed a large body 
of empirical work that tackles conditions of unequal participation (see Pateman, 2012; 
De Souza Santos, 2006). Citizen juries, panels, participatory budgeting, all constitute 
attempts to secure participation from marginalised groups of citizens unable to have a 
say about the way they are governed – and this is especially the case when we look at 
deliberative/participatory initiatives in the Global South (see Thompson and Tapscott, 
2010; Kopf, 2010). 
Therefore, the important point here is that with this variant we have a stronger 
emphasis on the conditions for exercising citizenship – rather than the measures for 
securing inclusive citizenship (that we find in the pluralist variant). With this 
emphasis an additional dimension of noncitizenship comes to the fore. Noncitizens 
are not only those excluded, marginalised, stigmatised or demonised by the formal 
and uniform politics of citizenship; but also the poor, the unskilled, the exploited or 
the unequal (a more refined category than the excluded). Noncitizens, in other words, 
are the non-actors – those who lack the resources to act and, thus, miss out on the 
benefits of citizenship in their everyday life where meaningful access to citizenship 
matters the most. 
This brings us to the second, perhaps more crucial, contribution of the democratic 
variant to narratives of inclusive citizenship: the citizenisation of noncitizens. By 
citizenisationiii, I mean processes of citizen formation – that is processes of citizen-
becoming or citizen-constitution as these arise in particular (though various) locales, 
as a result of specific enabling conditions (or their lack thereof).iv The primacy given 
to practice by the democratic variant encases this promise of citizenisation and, in so 
doing, it gives the idea of inclusionary citizenship its most radical ‘twist’: everyone 
can become a citizen, even though not anyone is a citizen (see Tully 2008b, 99). By 
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engaging in practices that converse with the institutional politics of the given 
citizenship order, contesting, or going against these, political subjects become 
citizens.  This insight into processes of citizenisation evades the divide between the 
citizen and the noncitizen, democracy (citizenship) and politics (noncitizenship) that 
is still folded into the political variant with its limited focus on the migrant. So long as 
someone acts with the aim of drawing attention to injustice, inequality, subordination 
or marginalisation, one acts as, and thus is, a citizen. Whether the actor has access to 
rights is irrelevant. Instead, what is relevant is that the citizen emerges out of this 
struggle for democracy. That is why she is now seen as a democratic actor, and not 
merely as a political subject; because she seeks such distinctly democratic idea(l)s as 
equality, justice, recognition, inclusion. At the same time, the very focus on citizen-
becoming, rather than citizen-being, inverts the meaning of inclusive citizenship (Isin, 
2008). It is not the inclusion of the ‘other’ that makes citizenship inclusive, but the 
reverse; it is the expansive account of democracy that invites the inclusion of the 
noncitizen into the world of citizenship. It is noteworthy, then, that both citizenship 
and inclusion, albeit their reconception, remain firmly at the centre of the democratic 
variant, much like in the pluralist and political ones. 
This is where, I now argue, the limits of all three variants lie. By retaining the focus 
on citizenship and inclusion, the pluralist, political and democratic variants end up 
reproducing, if not consolidating, the binary between citizenship and noncitizenship. 
Of course, the underlying argument here is not that we need to turn away from the 
order of citizenship, dismissing its politics, that are, after all, the last stronghold of 
state sovereignty and, as such, the subject in need of continuous interrogation; nor 
does the argument intend to gloss over or undermine demands and struggles for 
inclusion. Rather, the point here is that it is one thing to recognise the reality of 
citizenship and its exclusionary implications for those who are not part of it, and quite 
another to see citizenship as the highest, most valuable practice, the benchmark for 
evaluating – acknowledging and noticing –the demands raised by a variety of groups. 
The second assumption, which is exactly what I find limiting here, perforates all three 
variants. In so doing, it reproduces, through the back door, the very binary between 
inside and outside that the pluralist, political, and democratic variants problematise. 
Indeed, whether we view the noncitizen as the subject who seeks to be recognised and 
included in the liberal order of citizenship through changes in law and access to rights 
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(pluralist variant); or as the migrant who enacts citizenship (political variant); or even 
as the non-actor who citizenizes through spontaneous and/or deliberative practice 
(democratic variant); it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the noncitizen is the 
inevitable victim of the state system that occasionally subjectifies to seek inclusion in 
that system, the highest order of citizenship. 
To explicate the point further, the problem with this conclusion is not victimhood per 
se - that as we have seen the political variant does a good job challenging - but the 
primacy given to  citizen-isation, that potentially undermines claims and demands for 
a better life in the here and now. By pointing to the larger scripts of citizenship that 
implicate institutions, state actors and societal attitudes, citizenship-construed 
demands displace the particular by the general – on the assumption that references to 
the general of citizenship give weight to particular claims to citizenship. However, do 
we need the lens of citizenship to respond to and address injustice, exclusion, 
discrimination? I will return to this question in the next section. Here suffice to notice 
that by taking citizenship as the benchmark for all political practice, the pluralist, 
political, and democratic variants reinstate the binary citizen/noncitizen that they seek 
to disturb and unsettle. 
The second limit of the pluralist, political, and democratic variants is closely 
related to the first one. It concerns the interrelation between citizenship and 
noncitizenship that runs through the three variants of inclusive citizenship. By 
tying noncitizenship with citizenship, that is, by tying the being of noncitizens 
with that of the citizens, all three variants cancel out noncitizenship as an 
analytical category. Noncitizenship becomes reduced to a journey to citizenship 
and, as such, as a journey, it looses meaning and force. At the same time, a 
retrospective reading arises that assimilates struggles for new kinds of politics 
into the canonical narrative of modern citizenship. James Tully is particularly 
attuned to this danger when he points out that even when the rights of noncitizens 
are institutionalised and their conditions bettered, this betterment  ‘is redescribed 
retrospectively as a stage in the development of modern citizenship and 
incorporated within its framework’ (Tully, 2014, 18-19). The danger, therefore, 
that Tully’s point alerts us to is that the very category of noncitizenship might 
inadvertently undermine struggles for another politics, by limiting these to 
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struggles for and against citizenship. However, as the next section shows, it is 
possible to take such struggles seriously without falling back on the vocabulary of 
noncitizenship. To this end, the next section explores the idea of politicisation and 
contrasts its analytical force with that of the category of noncitizenship.
Rethinking Noncitizenship 
The previous section developed two arguments. The first argument was that the 
analytical category of noncitizenship is closely entangled not just with citizenship by 
way of antithesis, but with accounts of inclusive citizenship in particular. By tracing 
the shifts and turnings in the concept of noncitizenship within such accounts, the 
previous section highlighted the floating nature of the concept that the pluralist, 
political and democratic variants exploit to the full. Three particular moments in the 
account of these variants are noteworthy. The first is that noncitizenship significantly 
expands and blurs with citizenship – once exclusion, marginalisation and 
stigmatisation are seen to be experienced by anyone whose identity does not conform 
to dominant norms. The second noteworthy moment in discussions of inclusion is that 
noncitizenship becomes synonymous with non-action – in the absence of enabling 
resources (material and cultural). Finally, processes of citizenisation – or citizen 
enactment in the vocabulary of the political variant - displace the analytical and legal 
category of noncitizenship. Although access to rights still formally distinguishes 
citizens from noncitizens, political agency and practice that is common to both 
categories, ensures that noncitizens become citizens when they politicise and engage 
in practices that challenge the exclusionary politics of citizenship. Does this indicate 
that noncitizenship is a superfluous category? The second argument of the previous 
section was that the very persistence of the binary between citizen/noncitizen 
undermines the analytical force of the category of noncitizenship. 
Of course, it might be objected that there are examples of noncitizenship that point to 
the opposite direction – particularly when noncitizenship is taken to denote partial 
access to the rights of citizenship in the state (or region) one resides but is not a full 
citizen of -  as a result of multilevel governance (for a critical account of multi-level 
citizenship see Bauböck and Guiraudon, 2009). Denizenship, for example, as 
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exemplified in the case of European citizens who ‘carry their citizenship  abroad and 
exercise it from outside’ has often been construed as a transgressive category that 
undermines, rather than reinforces, the citizen/noncitizen binary (Bauböck and 
Guiraudon, 2009, 440). However, it is also a more limited category in that it simply 
taps into and expands rights-based accounts of citizenship, leaving the exclusivity of 
the status of citizenship either untouched -  as is the case with the pluralist variant - or 
only partly questioned (when the focus is on the national dimension of citizenship). 
Nevertheless, cases of multi-level citizenship raise the question: is it possible to leave 
the citizen/noncitizen binary aside and see some strengths in noncitizenship as an 
analytical category? 
On the one hand, it can be argued that noncitizenship is a necessary category, because 
it captures the excess of politics. So long as there are citizens, there will be 
noncitizens, that is, a surplus or excess of politics – a political difference – that either 
does not conform to the given citizenship order and/or challenges the dominant norms 
of this order (see Honig, 1993). At the same time, it can be argued that noncitizenship 
is not just a necessary category, but also a useful one. It alerts us to the exclusions, 
inequalities, marginalisations and naturalisations that accompany citizenship politics. 
Therefore, by continuously interrogating who the noncitizens are, we keep an eye on 
democratic exclusions and, in so doing, we ward off – or at least we attempt to ward 
off – closures and exclusions. On the other hand, however, it can also be argued that 
we do not need the category of noncitizenship to notice and attend to democratic 
closures and exclusions. After all, instances of injustice and inequality can be 
recognised without resorting to the vocabulary of noncitizenship, as any newspaper 
reader will immediately confirm. More than that, terms such as ‘inequality’, 
‘destitution’, ‘injustice’ are more powerful than ‘noncitizenship’ to capturing 
attention and stirring action. 
Of course, it can be argued that noncitizenship foregrounds questions of democracy. 
By enquiring into democratic exclusions – the ways in which liberal democracies fail 
to admit, integrate, and support ‘difference’ or ‘otherness’ – the concept of 
noncitizenship forces us to continuously assess and evaluate the ways in which 
democratic idea(l)s translate into democratic practice. But, still, do we need the 
category of noncitizenship to evaluate the quality of democratic life? As the previous 
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section argued there is something disturbing in the idea – in vogue today – that all 
politics be read as citizenship politics to gain democratic ground. The assumption that 
informs this idea, that citizenship is the most valuable practice, the door to a better 
politics, tends not just to underplay the particularity of the given demand and struggle, 
but also to undermine the very plurality of politics. To be sure, it is vital that struggles 
against exclusion, inequality and injustice gain democratic ground (and are translated 
into measures that reflect these gains). However, it is questionable whether they need 
the lens of noncitizenship to do so. Politicisation can do the same work. The 
remaining of this section explains why. It starts by identifying the overlap between 
politicisation and noncitizenship; and it moves on to discuss the two components of 
the politicising process that make it a better alternative to noncitizenship. 
By politicisation, I mean a process of political subjectification where subjects 
excluded from the institutional world direct attention to their situation and, through 
public action, bring visibility to the inequalities and injustices permeating this world 
(see Rancière, 1999). Politicisation, therefore, like the category of noncitizenship, 
confronts relations of power and inequality,  presupposes agency and involves 
practice. In particular, subjects who politicise seek to challenge the established order. 
They bring into view the power dynamics behind this order – its closures, injustices 
and inequalities; and, in so doing, they openly unsettle these. Although it can be 
credibly objected here that the noncitizens (the poor, excluded, marginalised) are not 
always in a position to politicise and confront the power order – and this alone reveals 
the force of noncitizenship as an analytical category; it can be argued that 
noncitizenship, much like the concept of politicisation in this sense, promises 
something more than a comprehensive exposé of the inequalities perforating a given 
power order. It promises citizenisation. Citizenisation involves political 
subjectification – as is the case with politicisation. At the same time, politicisation, 
like citizenisation or noncitizenship for that matter, gains momentum through 
references to a variety of scripts, from ‘justice’ and ‘equality’ to even ‘citizenship’ – 
and this means that either sections of society politicise to give visibility to the 
position/demands of those who cannot, or the excluded and marginalised subjectify 
and politicise. Therefore, the point here is that there is significant overlap between the 
concepts of politicisation and noncitizenship when it comes to matters of 
subjectification and counter-power. There is also overlap with respect to practice. 
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Politicisation is practice, for subjects politicise against or for something– for example, 
by setting up a sit-in, a protest, an occupation etc. In fact, political protests (against 
the state) can be seen as exemplary moments of politicisation, where the binary 
citizen/noncitizen becomes redundant. 
In particular, what makes protests exemplary moments of politicisation (at least in the 
way I use the term here) is their public nature – the publicity, connection, openness 
and generality that they encase. Protests publicise exclusion X; they make it visible. 
They are public events and this means that they both reach out to the public and draw 
in (the support of) the public – broadly understood. At the same time, public protests 
are sites of assembling. They gather the people together and, in this gathering, it 
makes little difference who is the citizen and who is not, or who initiated the protest 
and who did not. What matters is that protests remain open and, as a result of this 
openness, demands flesh out, intermesh and expand. More than that, the openness of 
the protests compounded by the indeterminacy of the subject ‘people’ as a democratic 
actor has the additional effect of drawing sharper attention to the political demand or 
claim eliciting the protest. This is where, in the end, the greatest difference between 
the concepts of politicisation and noncitizenship lies: in their telos. Whereas the telos 
of politicisation, say in the case of public protests to stay with the same example, is to 
have the particular (series of) demands or claims met in the here and now – thus it has 
a rather limited, provisional, target that does not always or necessarily coincide with 
an expansion of rights; the telos of the category of noncitizenship is often, 
inadvertently, citizenship – and, this implicitly enfolds the aspiration to expand on 
existing rights.
By defending, therefore, politicisation I move a step further from the critical literature 
that sees the politicisations of noncitizens as intrinsic to the enactment of citizenship 
(Isin, 2008; Hepworth 2014a and 2014b). More than that, as William Walters warns, 
‘we should not overlook those moments when political interventions refuse to make 
strong claims in the name of citizenship … because subjects explicitly reject the 
rights, responsibilities and commitments that are associated with the citizen, or out of 
preference for other identities’ (2008, 185, 193).  Attending to such moments of 
struggle, that Walters refers to as ‘acts of demonstration’, opens the way for noticing 
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new possibilities that arise in the course of such struggles (2008, 194). To be sure, 
what Walters calls ‘acts of demonstration’ is what I here refer to as politicisation, for 
acts of demonstration ‘occur when an injustice is revealed, a relationship of power is 
contested, or a particular wrong is protested, but when the identity of the subjects, at 
the heart of the protest is left relatively open’ (Walters, 2008, 194). But there is a 
difference. Whereas Walters suggests that ‘acts of demonstration’ supplement 
political acts of noncitizenship, I suggest that politicisations blur with acts of 
noncitizenship. 
There are two reasons behind this suggestion. The first reason is that politicisations 
that do not tie the identity of the political subject with that of the citizen, promote a 
stronger conception of agency. This is particularly important for those subjects who 
are noncitizens for their entire life, such as for example Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon and/or the occupied territories who do not struggle for either Lebanese or 
Israeli citizenship (Salih, 2013; Allegra, 2009) . However, they do struggle to improve 
and renegotiate the conditions of their life in the here and now. This is a continuous 
and ordinary struggle, neither exceptional nor just disruptive as the literature on 
noncitizenship would have it (Hepworth, 2014a and 2014b). In this ongoing struggle, 
agency dissociates from identity (Salih, 2013). That is, political agency exceeds the 
identity of (non)citizenship and, it is important that work on citizenship studies 
acknowledges and recognises the indeterminacy of this agency. At the same time, 
politicisations that do not tie the identity of the subject with that of the citizen are 
potentially more effective in drawing attention to the exclusions and injustices of 
citizenship. Construed as political acts, they open up possibilities that resist the 
normalisations, naturalisations and framings that accompany references to citizenship. 
Thus, the following question arises: if politicisation is a potentially more effective – 
target specific – process of interrogating exclusions, then is it possible to give it some 
form beyond the setting of the public protest? In other words, is it possible to identify 
some of the components that contribute to its weight as a process?
James Tully gives us a good idea of one of these components. In his discussion of 
civic freedom, he offers sufficient cues to enable us to envision politicisation outside 
the setting of the public protest (2008a and 2008b). In particular, practices of civic 
freedom consist, according to Tully, of the freedom to question, renegotiate and, as a 
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result, renew the terms of the political game. For example, if there is, say, inequality 
and exploitation in the work place, the moment that groups of unequal/exploited 
workers question (from their different positions and for their different reasons), these 
relations of inequality, practices of civic freedom come into play. Indeed, practices of 
civic freedom, according to Tully, arise together with practices of governance –
understood in an expansive sense as relations of control (see Tully, 2008a, 24-25). In 
a typical Foucauldian way, therefore, what Tully tells us here, is that wherever there is 
power, closure, exclusion, there is resistance. There is the possibility to interrogate 
power and domination, confront and change it. Now, what I find useful in the idea of 
‘practices of civic freedom’ is, first, that they arise wherever there is domination, 
control, exclusion –  thus, the concept attends to the omnipresence of power, 
exclusion, inequality. Second, practices of civic freedom appear to have the same 
effect as noncitizenship, that is, they challenge exclusions without, however, pinning 
down the political subject behind them. Third, and perhaps more importantly, 
practices of civic freedom are neither necessarily nor exclusively aimed at introducing 
a change in the order of citizenship (by expanding, for example, its rights). They are 
just that: practices of freedom against relations of control, domination or 
subordination. Thus, practices of civic freedom can be seen as the politicised moment 
par excellence. What is missing from this moment is the focus on demands/claims 
that I previously tied with the idea of politicisation.  
To attend to this moment, and thus explore the second component of politicisation, we 
need to move a step further from Tully, and return to the idea of claims-making that I 
have already discussed in passing. The aim here is to make the connection between 
claims-making and politicisation explicit. Michael Saward (2006) talks about claims. 
Claims are for Saward performative, creative and representative. They can be taken 
up by all kinds of actors and they produce subjects, objects and audiences. For 
Saward, therefore, it is the claim itself that has productive effects (produces 
representation), not the subject who formulates the claim. Or, as he puts it: ‘what 
exists are claims and their receptions’ (Saward, 2006, 306). Indeed, by highlighting 
the constituting and everyday dimension of claims-making, Saward opens interesting 
lines of enquiry into its role in interrogating exclusive politics. To see these, we need 
to briefly look at the nature of claims-making. In particular, claims-making puts 
emphasis on the claim itself – since it is the specificity of the claim that constitutes 
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political projects. At the same time, the claim does more than facilitate the expression 
of a grievance or issue. Claims-making seeks to re-formulate and, indeed, re-negotiate 
the given unequal power distribution – this is why it is also relevant to long-term 
noncitizens. Claims open the way to re-negotiation because they are, first, necessarily 
narrower, target-specific, and more limited than citizenisations are. Second, claims to 
someone or something establish a relation of interdependence between the side that 
produces the given claim (the noncitizens) and the side that responds to the claim (the 
state). Third, and perhaps more importantly, claims already envelop alternatives to 
the existing order, since this is precisely what defines and distinguishes them as 
claims, the requests or demands they encase. 
Indeed, the very possibility of transforming the world of citizenship politics, by 
challenging and exposing the exclusions and injustices that define it in the here and 
now, is one dimension that for the time being escapes attempts to theoretically refine 
the category of noncitizenship. One reason for this is perhaps innate to the category of 
noncitizenship. Noncitizenship captures the journey to citizenship, the quest to be 
included in citizenship. It is a telic process and its telos, as I have been arguing 
throughout the paper, constitutes its key limit. Politicisation, by contrast, evades this 
limit because it draws attention to process, subjectification, agency and claims-making. 
Although the binary citizen/noncitizen can inform the politicizing process, it does not 
define it. This makes politicisation a potentially richer category than noncitizenship for 
theorising contentious politics over and against set frames of citizenship. Of course, the 
emphasis that I here place on politicisation does not imply that we altogether give up 
on the category of noncitizenship, for noncitizenship does not necessarily preclude 
politicisation. As the section showed, there is considerable overlap between the two 
concepts. However, what my emphasis on politicisation does imply is that we need to 
start by problematising the binary citizen/noncitizen that taps into attempts to theorise 
noncitizenship.  Although this is a difficult task, the undecidability of the prefix non 
invites attempts, such as this one, to travel the road away from citizenship. 
Conclusion
The paper explored the implications of the case for noncitizenship as a distinct 
analytical category. By tracing the  nature of the concept in trajectories of inclusive 
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citizenship, it argued that its key limit issues precisely from its entanglement with 
citizenship and citizenisation. To support this argument, the paper distinguished 
between a pluralist, political and democratic variant in accounts of inclusive 
citizenship; and it showed how they end up reinstating the very binary 
citizen/noncitizen that they intend to interrogate. Seeking to overcome this limitation, 
the paper discussed the idea of politicisation and contrasted its empowering potential 
with that of noncitizenship. Do we need, in the end, the category of noncitizenship to 
acknowledge and challenge relations of exclusion, power, inequality, injustice and 
discrimination? The paper answered this question by suggesting that to consolidate 
the analytical force of the category of noncitizenship we need to start with the 
difficult task of attenuating its relationship with citizenship. 
Endnotes:
i
 In contrast with outer exclusion that captures the reluctance to either admit outsiders 
into citizenship or trust them as co-citizens; ‘inner exclusion’ designates the 
subordination of other ways of being a citizen into the dominant mould of citizenship. 
This dimension of exclusionary politics has been heavily criticized by the literature on 
gender politics (Taylor, 1999; see also Young, 1995 and 2000; Lister 2003). 
ii
 Here it is important to note that I use the terms deliberation and participation 
interchangeably. For the opposite view see Mutz, 2006.
iii
 I borrow the term ‘citizenisation’ from the work of James Tully (2008a; 2008b).
iv
 Engin Isin (2008) gives the most sophisticated account of such processes of 
citizenisation when he distinguishes between acts of citizenship (that involve 
disruption, rupture, and a break with an order) and citizenship action (that envelops 
routine, habit and order). 
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